Obscurantism in the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and a Neologism-Proof Equilibrium

著者
Takakazu Honryo and Makoto Yano
シリーズ
MQ Discussion Series
DP番号
2015-004
公開年月
March, 2016
言語
英語
URL
ファイル
2015-004
備考
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Summary

During the Fukushima nuclear accident, the government informed people that something bad was happening but provided little information as to exactly how bad it was. Obscurantism refers to such a phenomena, which has been observed in different forms many times in the history. In order to explain obscurantism during the accident, we build a cheap talk game and characterize a neologism-proof perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This paper demonstrates that bad information is withheld if the public’s assessment on the government’s capability in maintaining an “orderly society”is too high and if the government places too much importance on this assessment.

 
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